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PREFACE
The Asian Business History Centre was established in 1996 in recognition of scholarly 
growing interest in the business traditions o f Asia. Its primary aim is to strengthen links 
with international research centres as well as with the business community in both 
Australia and Asia. Lecture series and conferences sponsored by the Centre provide a 
forum for our staff, students and international affiliates. The Centre supports an 
Occasional Paper series on Asian Business History and the Asian Business History 
Monograph series. Both series will be of particular relevance to the business and academic 
communities involved in or looking to expand their activities in Asia.
The Asian Business History Occasional Paper Series was established in 1998 to publish 
some of the papers presented at The University of Queensland Public Lecture Series on 
Asian Business History. A full list o f lectures delivered follows this paper.
Occasional papers in Asian Business History are published for the purpose o f academic 
discussion. Papers should be regarded as preliminary work in progress. Suggestions and 
comments should be addressed directly to the author.
Chi Kong Lai 
Editor and Director 
Asian Business History Centre 
The University of Queensland
Gambling Operations in Late Qing Guangdong
Ho Hon Wai
Throughout Chinese history, governments, considering gambling injurious to morals and 
a hotbed for crime, have rigorously sought prohibition. For a long time, the Manchu-Qing 
regime followed the precedents o f earlier periods with their policy o f banning gambling, 
despite the ban’s limited efficacy. From the 1860s the Qing government, in accordance 
with changes in the historical situation, gradually reevaluated its policy o f banning 
gambling. This paper takes Guangdong as the object o f research for the following reason. 
Given its fiscal importance, the gambling tax, as an element in the structure o f provincial 
fiscal administration, was a source o f funds not to be ignored. Whether you look at it in 
terms o f its absolute figures or relative proportion o f revenues, the gambling tax held a 
position in the structure o f Guangdong provincial fiscal administration which most sources 
o f revenue in the province, and similar categories o f tax in other provinces, could not 
compare.1
It should be noted that few serious scholarly studies have been undertaken 
regarding the gambling operations in the late Qing period. There are two principal reasons 
for this. First, most scholars have heretofore focussed on prominent mercantile forces that 
played an active role in history; such as the Shanxi merchants, the Huizhou merchants of 
Anhui, the salt merchants of Yangzhou and the Co-hong merchants of Guangdong, as well 
as other merchant groups that displayed signs o f growing vitality.2 Consequently, scholars 
have paid comparatively less attention to the gambling syndicates o f late Qing Guangdong. 
Secondly, in the past gambling was censured by public opinion because it was considered 
to have a corrupting influence on public morals. Since gambling was regarded as taboo, 
it was seldom mentioned. Therefore, source materials on gambling operations are rare, 
making the study o f this area a difficult undertaking.
This paper aims first to fill an existing historiographical gap and more importantly, 
to employ the case study of gambling operations in Guangdong, with particular reference 
to the response they elicited from the provincial authorities, to provide a better 
understanding o f official-merchant relations during the late Qing period. On account of 
the paucity o f written materials, which is the most serious obstacle to this study, I limit 
myself to threading together available fragments o f historical information in order to 
outline the essential features of gambling operations in late Qing Guangdong. I hope that 
this study will encourage further debate regarding this issue. Below I briefly outline the 
sketch I am going to present on the following pages.
Gambling operations in late Qing Guangdong were conducted on the basis of 
revenue farming. In most circumstances gambling farmers ran their business under the 
name of gongsi, (for Fantan gambling3 the case is slightly different, for details see below), 
whose relations with the provincial government formed the core o f this study. This paper 
begins with a discussion o f the origin, organisation and terms o f operation o f the gongsi 
as well as the background of the gambling farmers. With regard to the terms o f operation, 
topics covered include types o f games, their duration and territorial confines to be 
franchised. As far as the structure o f the gongsi is concerned, although the author tries his 
best to tie all available scraps o f information into some kind o f coherent story, many 
intricate details are still obscure. Taking into consideration the availability o f data, the
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main focus o f this research will be on the experience o f the Hongfeng gongsi. Following 
this, I will address the gongsi’s relations with the provincial authorities. The author finds 
that although the gambling syndicates paid off the provincial authorities in order to develop 
their business, they were completely at the mercy o f the government that squeezed or bled 
them whenever necessity arose. Gambling syndicates also encountered vehement 
competition from illicit and unlicensed business rivals through the connivance o f the local 
constabulary and underlings. Finally, this paper will draw a comparison between the 
experience o f the gambling syndicates and that o f other revenue farms in the province, as 
well as that o f other privileged mercantile groups in the country.
Legalised gambling operations in late Qing Guangdong were monopolised by 
syndicates which advanced a lump sum of franchise tax to the provincial authorities as 
payment for their right to undertake the enterprise. It is very likely that such a practice was 
composed o f indigenous and foreign practices. According to Lien-sheng Yang, the 
practice of tax farming can be traced back as early as 486 AD; during the Song dynasty, 
its wide prevalence can be indicated by the fact that the government fanned out 
monopolies of liquor, tea and salt, county by county.4 Apart from this long-standing origin, 
the Guangdong authorities might have taken into consideration the practices o f farming out 
gambling in Macao and Southeast Asia, especially that in Siam, when they first adopted 
the same measure for the Weixing, which was a form of lottery on the names of successful 
competitors in the triennial and provincial examinations of 1885. This was not groundless 
speculation.
Political leaders o f colonial Southeast Asia, whether Europeans or Southeast 
Asians, depended on revenue farming on account o f the inadequacy o f the administrative 
machinery, capital and specialised knowledge to collect revenue themselves, while revenue 
farming assured them a reliable source o f income and a regular means o f tax assessment. 
Because o f the weakness of the state, they delegated the collection o f taxes to farmers. At 
the time, it was the Chinese business groupings that had the resources to operate the farms 
and immigrant Chinese working on mines and plantations. These were the farms’ principal 
targets. In fact, revenue farms represented 27 per cent o f total revenues o f the VOC in Asia 
during 1653, in which the role o f Chinese gambling is striking.5
On the eve o f the Sino-French war over Vietnam in 1884, Zheng Guanying, the 
noted reformer, had been dispatched to Southeast Asia to collect enemy intelligence on 
behalf o f the Guangdong authorities. He arrived in Siam in the 6th moon o f the year, and 
had a vivid account o f the tax farming o f the Huahui gambling6 there.7 At that time, the 
Guangdong authorities had placed a ban on all forms o f gambling activities within the 
province. As a result, most o f the gambling syndicates moved their business to Macao, 
where the Portuguese granted them a franchise and collected an annual revenue amounting 
to about 500,000 dollars in return. A keen observer on this matter was Zheng, a native of 
Xiangshan, a county in the proximity o f Macao. At the end o f 1884, Peng Yulin, the 
imperial commissioner dispatched to Guangdong during the Sino-French war, entrusted 
Zheng with the task o f investigating the Weixing gambling and recommending measures 
to extend the franchise. After much deliberation, Zheng stated that for the farming out of 
the Weixing, it was best for the provincial authorities to follow the practices o f the west 
by means o f public bidding; successful bidders were required to pay bills as a deposit in 
security, while the meddling of underlings and clerks were strictly prohibited.8 It is highly 
probable that the “practices o f the west” were, in fact, what Zheng took notice of in the 
colonial regimes o f Macao and Southeast Asia.
In most cases, gambling syndicates in late Qing Guangdong ran their business 
under the name o f certain “gongsi”, which in essence, was a form o f traditional business
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partnership that had a long history of growth.9 According to Tian Rukang, the term gongsi 
originates in the rural communities o f Fujian and Guangdong. Here the practice o f 
entrusting reserved funds or public property to business partners or clan members in 
rotation was known as gongsi.10 Luo Xianglin further indicates that gongsi had something 
to do with gambling. He asserts that the people in south China, especially the Hakkas, 
usually formed a partnership known as gongsi once they embarked upon business, 
gambling in particular, in which each partner held shares in proportion to his capital or 
labour contributed to the enterprise.11 Possibly, it is against this background that gambling 
syndicates in late Qing Guangdong merely followed old traditions o f their forerunners.
Provincial authorities delimited locations where franchised gambling syndicates 
were allowed to run their business in consideration o f law and order. Syndicates were 
prohibited from extending their operations to those regions where there was a complete 
absence o f their activities heretofore, unless an additional franchise tax was paid. The 
Guangdong authorities reiterated this stand in 1900,1901 and 1902.12 Franchised gambling 
syndicates set up headquarters in Guangzhou, the provincial capital, and farmed out branch 
networks in other counties delimited by the authorities within the province. In some cases, 
branches were also found outside the province and were not solely run by natives. In 1901 
there existed an opinion that it was better for branches to be run by natives who could 
operate the business with greater dexterity and on more familiar grounds than 
non-natives.13 Status o f the branches received no recognition from the provincial 
authorities, which would deal with the head farmers only. In 1901 the Supreme Board of 
Reorganization stated that it was against all precedents for branches to approach the 
provincial authorities directly, bypassing the main syndicates. Only on the occasion o f a 
main-branch dispute could the branch appeal to provincial officials for redress. Three years 
later, the provincial authorities reiterated the same stand, indicating that they would not 
even accept branches’ petitions by mail.14 For Bantan concession, except for the span 
when the Huitan Gongsi undertook the enterprise, head farmers and main syndicates were 
absent for most o f the time. Contractual licenses were farmed out to individual farmers 
within a certain area undertaking the business.
There were marked discrepancies in the duration o f business operations among 
different kinds o f gambling activities. Proceeds from the contractual licence for 
undertaking the Fantan business formed the staple o f gambling revenue in late Qing 
Guangdong, followed by those from franchising the White Pigeon Lottery and the Shan 
and Pu Lotteries, while that from the concession of the Weixing was in the rear. (For exact 
amount see below.) It should be borne in mind that the Fantan went on day and night 
throughout the year, while the White Pigeon Lottery drew once daily; the Shan Lottery 
four times and the Pu Lottery thrice monthly. As to the Weixing, it happened only when 
the civil service or the martial art examinations were held. This accounts for the 
discrepancies in their revenue-generating capacity. It should be noted that the franchise 
tax for the Fantan, White Pigeon Lottery, and Shan and Pu lotteries were on an annual 
basis. For Weixing concession, payment o f the franchise tax during the 1st term was spread 
out over six years, while for the 2nd and 3rd terms, payment was made at the civil service 
and martial art examination. With regard to the duration o f the contract, in the cases of the 
Weixing and Caipiao Lotteries, a term o f operation was o f six years duration and for the 
White Pigeon Lottery, it was o f four years duration. For running the business o f the Shan 
and Pu Lotteries, each term lasted eight years, whereas for the Fantan, it was merely a span 
o f three years.
As to the background of the gambling farmers, I can only sketch out their general 
picture from the limited materials, using the Hongfeng Gongsi, a syndicate that enjoyed
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a franchise for operating the weixing gambling from 1897 to 1903, as an illustration. 
Prominent partners of the Gongsi included Liu Xuexun, Liu Weichuan, Wei Song, Wei Yu 
and Lu Jiu. The first four partners were natives of Xiangshan county, while Liu Weichuan 
and the Wei brothers were also fellow villagers. Liu Xuexun earned the juren  (2nd degree 
graduate) qualification in 1879, and obtained his jinshi degree in the metropolitan 
examination seven years later. He held the position o f expectant prefect. He was a 
member on the board o f directors o f the Imperial Bank o f China, which was established 
in 1897. He had operated gambling businesses, especially the Weixing, in Macao and 
Guangzhou. In fact, he ran the syndicate that acquired the right to undertake the 2nd term 
Weixing gambling. Although he was the principal shareholder o f the Hongfeng Gongsi, 
he kept himself in the background and brought Wei Song to the forefront due to his 
embarrassment at failing to meet his obligation during his term o f undertaking (see below). 
Liu Weichuan and the Wei brothers worked for foreign banks as compradors in Hong 
Kong, Liu and Wei Song for the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporations, while 
Wei Yu for the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China. They were the top 
echelon o f the Chinese community in the colony. All o f them were appointed Justices of 
the Peace, moreover, Wei Yu was appointed to the legislative council from 1896 to 1917 and 
was knighted in 1919. The Liu and the Wei families were also united in bonds of wedlock. 
It was reported that in his capacity as comprador o f the Hong Kong Bank Liu made a lot 
o f money by clever manipulation o f the bill o f exchanges. Lu Jiu’s father built up his 
fortune from banking in Macao; nevertheless, he purchased the official qualifications of 
linsheng (salaried graduate o f the 1st degree) and gongsheng (senior licentiate) for career 
enhancement. He held such honorific official titles as special appointed prefect and salt 
controller by purchase. He added to his wealth through commercial pursuits, and also 
acquired a considerable fortune out o f gambling operations in Macao. The Chinese and 
Portuguese governments bestowed upon him honours in praise o f his community service.15
Based on the above information, I have made the following preliminary 
observations on the essential features o f the Hongfeng Gongsi. First, most o f its partners 
came from a higher stratum of society; being thirsty for profit they did not consider it 
beneath their dignity to operate gambling business. O f these, the most notable figure was 
Liu Xuexun, who reached the high rung of the ladder of success in his capacity o f a jinshi 
degree holder. Second, some o f its partners such as Liu Xuexun and Lu Jiu held honorific 
official appointments, which was an asset in their dealings with provincial officials. It 
should be borne in mind that merchants were inferior to mandarins in social position in 
traditional China. Third, to a great extent, its partners were connected together by fellow 
village relationships. O f the seven shareholders o f the gongsi, four were natives of 
Xiangshan county, and what is more, o f these four, three had connection to the same 
village, Qianshan, and their relationship was further cemented by marriage among their 
family members. This relationship bore the characteristics o f the gongsi, which originated 
in the rural communities o f Fujian and Guangdong. Last, among the shareholders, Liu 
Weichuan and the Wei brothers had carved out a career as compradors of foreign banks for 
themselves. It should be noted that it was a common practice among the compradors of 
19th century China to exploit their position for their private ends through questionable 
manipulation.16 Liu formed no exception to this phenomenon; money reaped from such 
a venture was a great help to the Gongsi in time o f need.
What concerned the provincial authorities the most was whether franchised 
gambling syndicates would faithfully observe their commitment, especially the payment 
of franchise taxes and contributions according to schedule. It was not uncommon for 
gambling syndicates that failed to observe their commitments to forfeit their right to
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operate the business. Apart from financial considerations, the provincial government 
attached great importance to this matter on the grounds that such a measure would screen 
swindlers from undertaking the task.17
For those franchised gambling syndicates, the top priority was how to safeguard 
their monopoly from unlicensed and illicit business rivals. For instance, in 1899, the 
franchised syndicate for the Weixing gambling, Hongfeng Gongsi, lodged a complaint 
against the large number o f illicit bookmakers within its scope o f operation, and urged the 
provincial government to place a curb upon them.18 When the franchised syndicates for 
the White Pigeon Lottery and the Fantan gambling faced similar troubles in 1901, they 
made demands on the authorities to weed out illicit bookmakers.19
For the Weixing farmers, apart from their concern for competition from illicit 
bookmakers, they also paid serious attention to the schedule o f the civil and martial art 
examinations on which their immediate interests were more contingent. In 1893, on the 
occasion o f Empress Dowager Cixi’s 60th birthday, the Qing government gave consent to 
the Guangdong authorities to hold two special examinations, one civil service, the other 
martial arts, on the 8th and 10th moons as an act of imperial grace. The 1st degree (xiucai) 
examination was to be held around the 7th and 8th moon as usual. As these examinations 
were so closely scheduled, the betting on the Weixing gambling would be adversely 
affected, so the franchised syndicate asked for the postponement o f the xiucai examination. 
Their request met with the provincial authorities’ approval.20 This instance indicates that 
the gambler’s interests took precedence over other consideration.
For attracting potential gambling farmers to the business and dispelling their 
misgiving, the provincial government always assured them that apart from the franchise 
tax it would ban all other illegal fees and exaction. When the Governor-Generals Zhang 
Zhidong and Tan Zhonglin invited syndicates to undertake the 1st term (1884-90) and the 
3rd term (1897-1904) Weixing lotteries, they made it clear that they would honour their 
promise on this matter.21
Nevertheless, stereotyped formalities and actual situations were entirely different. 
Gambling farmers undertook the business in the hope that their involvement would bring 
in fat returns. More often than not, they found themselves caught in a quandary. When the 
Weixing Lottery was first farmed out, it was stipulated that in fulfilment o f the requirement 
o f paying a franchise tax o f 4.4 million dollars during the term o f operation, successful 
bidders would be free from all other forms o f exaction as these had already been 
incorporated into the regular tax. However, when Zhang Zhidong initiated minting in 
Guangzhou in 1888, he forced the Weixing farmers to contribute 800,000 dollars to the 
purchase o f minting machines. This turned out to be an established practice rather than a 
temporary expedient. In the same year, there were special examinations held in 
Guangdong; in turn, the business o f the Weixing lottery improved. In response to this 
Zhang imposed a forced contribution o f 400,000 taels on the syndicate for the building of 
a projected textile factory within the province. Forced contributions did not end with 
Zhang’s departure. When he was transferred from Guangzhou to Wuchang, Zhang Zhidong 
decided to move the projected textile factory there. Nevertheless, he had his eyes on the 
Weixing syndicate once again. At his insistence, Li Hanzhang, the new Governor-General, 
levied a forced contribution on the new Weixing syndicate when it took over the business 
and started its new term o f operation, and lent it to Zhang.22 Sheltering themselves under 
the provincial authorities’ influence, gambling syndicates might have been able to fend off 
extortion and the exaction from underlings and clerks.23 Nevertheless, they found 
themselves in a more difficult predicament; they were milked dry by the provincial 
authorities whenever the government initiated any new undertakings.
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For the gambling fanners, the franchise tax by itself was a heavy burden even in 
the absence o f forced contributions and other demands. Here, I use the experience of the 
Weixing syndicates as an illustration. According to the agreement between the provincial 
government and the Weixing syndicates during the 1st and the 2nd terms o f their operations, 
for each term the franchise tax was fixed at 4.4 million dollars. The syndicate that 
undertook the 2nd term gambling operation was required to pay an additional tax o f 700,000 
taels whenever there were special civil service examination and martial arts examination 
which were held triennially and provincially, apart from the prescribed franchise tax.24 It 
turned out that the Weixing syndicates for these two terms all ended in a terrible fix. 
Payment o f the franchise tax was in arrears; for the syndicate that undertook the 2nd term 
Weixing Lottery, tax arrears amounted to more than 1.3 million dollars. Provincial 
authorities used coercion to make these two syndicates work off their arrears. In fact, 
before their obligation was discharged, the head o f the first syndicate was detained, while 
that o f the second, Liu Xuexun, was deprived o f his honorific official title.25
On the expiration of the contract for running the 2nd term Weixing lottery, 
provincial authorities invited candidates to undertake the enterprise for the next term. Tan 
Zhonglin, the Governor-General stated that all forms o f customary fees and charges were 
to be spread over the contribution, which nearly tripled from 800,000 dollars to about 2.22 
million dollars so that underlings and clerks had no excuse for extortion. Moreover, Tan 
made it clear that only those who had paid the prescribed contribution in full were 
permitted to take over the right to operate the Weixing lottery. Because o f this requirement, 
he expected that only candidates o f ample means could undertake the task and the 
unpleasant experiences o f the previous two terms would not be repeated.
As the sum involved for undertaking the enterprise was substantial, there was only 
a lukewarm response to the invitation. In the 4th moon of 1896 a syndicate controlled by Cai 
Shaode and Zheng Jingfu expressed interest in the matter. O f the prescribed contribution 
o f 2.22 million dollars, it promised to pay 300,000 dollars in advance and the rest in full 
shortly after. It turned out that the syndicate was unable to fulfill their commitment.2^  The 
provincial authorities were dissatisfied with this situation; however, they had no 
alternatives but to re-negotiate the matter with the syndicate.27 After much bargaining as 
to the terms o f payment, the syndicate ultimately offered to forward one million taels 
(about 1.39 million dollars) by the end of the year and all the rest in the next year. In spite 
o f the repeated extensions granted by the authorities, the syndicate was unable to meet its 
commitment. It merely forwarded 580,000 taels (about 800,000 dollars) by the end of the 
year and came to a standstill. As a result, it was sacked with the forfeiture o f all its prepaid 
expenses.28 In view o f this situation, the provincial authorities offered better terms; 
although the total sum of the contribution remained unchanged, candidates could take up 
the business once they forwarded one million taels instead o f the whole o f the prescribed 
amount o f 1.6 million taels. Provincial authorities indicated that the government would 
take over the business in case there were no takers.29
Afterwards the syndicate, the Hongfeng Gongsi, acquired the right to undertake the 
Weixing lottery in the 4th moon o f 1897 upon the payment o f one million taels in 
compliance with the wishes o f the provincial government. According to the agreement, it 
was required to pay the franchise tax, the contribution and additional tax for special civil 
service and martial art examinations. It should be noted that apart from the above 
commitment, the Hongfeng Gongsi was obliged to forward a sum o f 450,000 dollars in 
addition to the original quota o f 4.4 million dollars.30
Once the Hongfeng Gongsi launched itself into business, things did not go 
smoothly. Incorporation o f all forms o f customary fees into the contribution brought
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limited benefits to the Gongsi. The introduction o f this measure deprived the local 
constabulary and underlings of a handsome income. In compensation for their losses they 
gave tacit consent to illicit Weixing operations, from which they received bribes on a large 
scale.31 The unremitting activities o f the illicit weixing bookmakers placed the business 
interests o f the Hongfeng Gongsi in jeopardy. Although provincial authorities took 
measures against such activities at the repeated requests o f the Hongfeng Gongsi, in view 
o f collusion between the local constabulary and the illicit Weixing bookmakers it seems 
that the suppression was o f limited efficacy.32
For the Hongfeng Gongsi, the challenge from its business rivals was a minor issue 
in comparison with the heavy burden o f the regular franchise tax and the forced 
contribution. Its involvement in the undertaking of the Shan and Pu Lotteries in the name 
o f the Hongfa Gongsi further exacerbated the situation as the financial pressure on it 
increased substantially (see below). Its right to the operation o f the Weixing was due to 
expire in 1904. On inquiry, the Hongfeng Gongsi revealed that it had no intention of 
carrying on the business for the new term on the grounds that the future o f the civil service 
examination was uncertain.33 Probably, this was merely the ostensible reason as it was in 
dire financial straits by that time. To a considerable extent, Hongfeng’s precarious 
solvency relied on the manipulations o f its two shareholders, Liu Weichuan and Ma Fat­
ting. Liu, in his capacity as the comprador o f the Hong Kong Bank, engaged in the illegal 
practice o f bill manipulation without the Bank’s knowledge; he advanced a considerable 
portion o f the yield o f these bills to the Gongsi. In 1904 bills under his charge were found 
to be dishonoured and his illicit activities were exposed. This entailed disastrous 
consequences. Heavy liabilities forced him into bankruptcy.34 A chain o f misfortune 
followed. Another shareholder o f the Gongsi, Ma Fat-ting, manager o f the native bank, Lai 
Hing, was involved in the financial troubles because o f his close association with Liu 
Weichuan in pursuit o f profit through bill manipulations. His bank overextended credits 
to its clients, o f which the Hongfeng Gongsi was the largest. The bank went into 
liquidation when it was unable to call back its loans.35 The complete failure o f these two 
shareholders forced the Gongsi into insolvency, which in turn, spelled the ruin o f another 
shareholder, Wei Song.36 Beset with insurmountable difficulties the Hongfeng Gongsi 
collapsed in 1905. Even so, the provincial government did not loosen its grip on the 
Gongsi; it ordered the arrest o f Leong Cheong-sui, manager of the Hongfeng Gongsi, and 
the confiscation o f his property. Nevertheless, Leong had wind o f this order in advance 
and he fled to Hong Kong with all his money.37 O f the shareholders in Hong Kong, only 
Wei Yu avoided his fate in this storm.
The prospect o f the Weixing business was bleak as potential bidders were hesitant 
to undertake the enterprise during this transition period. In these circumstances, the 
Guangdong authorities had to reduce the franchise tax in order to elicit tenders. A new 
syndicate ultimately agreed to undertake the new term o f Weixing business from 1905 on 
at such liberal terms o f payment —  a much reduced franchise tax o f 2.8 million taels 
during its term o f undertaking and a contribution o f 530,000 taels in a lump sum. The 
syndicate was also required to forward an additional franchise tax of 350,000 taels as there 
were two special examinations in the course o f this term. With the abolition o f the civil 
service examination in 1905, this scheme miscarried.38
Relations between the provincial government and the gambling farmers entered a 
new phase at the turn o f the century. The financial position o f the Qing government 
deteriorated further in the last decade o f the dynasty. With the launching o f new reforms 
within their jurisdiction and the ever-increasing quota allotments (tanpai) from the centre, 
provincial authorities found themselves running short o f means to deal with the situation.
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As the potentialities o f gambling taxes had not brought into full play, the Guangdong 
authorities would not let them slip out o f their hands. From 1900 on, the provincial 
government lifted the ban on the White Pigeon Lottery, Fantan, Shan and Pu Lotteries at 
one stroke and awarded the franchise from their own financial consideration. During this 
period the provincial government was ruthless in their dealings with the gambling farmers. 
It treated the gambling farmers as a target for milking and the agreement for undertaking 
gambling operations as mere formalities. Gambling fanners enjoyed no legal protection 
at all.
It is here, that the author can employ experiences o f the operation o f the White 
Pigeon Lottery, Fantan and Shan and Pu Lotteries as an illustration o f the relationship 
between the provincial government and the gambling farmer during this period. In 1900 
the Hongyuan Gongsi acquired the right to undertake the operation o f the White Pigeon 
Lottery within the province. The terms were: for a duration o f four years it would pay an 
annual franchise tax o f 800,000 dollars as well as a lump sum contribution o f 400,000 
dollars.39 Afterwards there were other syndicates that offered even better terms for 
undertaking the enterprise. The provincial government seized this opportunity to increase 
the franchise tax and coerced the Hongyuan Gongsi into submission. The Hongyuan 
Gongsi expressed its willingness to increase the franchise tax by about 300,000 taels (about 
400,000 dollars) but received a flat refusal from the provincial government.40 By the end 
of the year the provincial government scrapped Hongyuan’s franchise and entrusted the 
undertaking o f the White Pigeon Lottery to a syndicate that offered better terms.41 
Unfortunately, the syndicate turned out to be unable to meet its obligation and forfeited its 
franchise and its security deposit accordingly. At this critical moment the Hongyuan 
Gongsi made an appeal to Li Hongzhang, the ex-Govemor-General who had awarded the 
Gongsi the franchise and was imperial commissioner in Beijing at the time. Through the 
influence o f Li, the Gongsi regained its right to undertake the enterprise by raising the 
annual sum of the franchise tax by 200,000 dollars.42 Because o f this experience, the 
Gongsi was constantly haunted by the fear o f losing its franchise. In 1904 on the eve of the 
expiry o f its franchise, the Gongsi indicated that it would make no attempt to carry on the 
business in the future.43 On that occasion, Cen Chunxuan, the Governor-General, was 
about to launch a campaign to prohibit the White Pigeon Lottery.44 His measure offered 
a key to the solution o f the problems o f the Gongsi. The White Pigeon Lottery came to a 
termination once Cen imposed a ban against the game from May 1904.
Concerning the gambling concession for Fantan in Guangdong under the system 
in existence before tax was officially imposed in 1900, Fantan dealers had to subscribe a 
sum of customary fees to the provincial official hierarchy, which in turn, contributed 40 
per cent o f its receipts from this source to the provincial arsenal for the purchase of 
machinery. This practice was known as wenwu yamen sicheng baoxiao (40 per cent 
contribution from the provincial civil and military organisations), which was, in essence, 
a bribe in exchange for the operation o f the business. When Tan Zhonglin took office as 
Governor-General o f the province, he felt that this practice compromised the integrity of 
officialdom. In consequence, he placed a ban on the receipt o f customary fees and did 
away with the item wenwu yamen sicheng baoxiao.
The prohibition, however, became a dead letter because o f lax enforcement. In 
view o f this, customary fees were restored in 1900 and Fantan gambling was officially 
legalised from then on; a quota for licensing the Fantan gambling amounting to 1.2 million 
taels was set up, o f which 700,000 taels were to be assigned to Fantan dealers in the 
provincial capital, Guangzhou, while the remaining 500,000 taels were to be shared out 
among other dealers throughout the province. Proceeds from the allotment were delivered
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to the Supreme Board o f Reorganization. In September 1900 the licensing enterprise of 
Fantan gambling in the province was taken by a syndicate known as the Huitai Gongsi, 
which agreed to subscribe an annual tax of 2 million dollars and a contribution of $800,000 
to the provincial government, while all other kinds o f exaction were abolished.45
However, this syndicate turned out to be unreliable, while non-approved official 
exaction went on as before. In 1903 the licensing of Fantan business was put on a guandu 
shangban (official supervision and merchant management) basis. The administration of 
the provincial fantan gambling was entrusted to the Jibu jingfei zongju (General Office for 
the Expenses for Arresting and Prosecuting Criminals at large), which had been established 
in 1901.46 This organisation solicited new application to run the business; an annual quota 
o f 3 million dollars was assigned to successful new tenders. In 1905 the office was 
amalgamated with the Supreme Board o f Reorganization, and the gambling tax was put 
under the Board’s management. The franchise quota for the enterprise was raised to 
4,307,700 dollars.47
In fact, such an increase was a flagrant breach o f the agreement whose term of 
validity lasted till 1906. In 1904 it was widely reported that Fantan dealers at the western 
suburb o f Guangzhou, the most prosperous part of the city were offered the alternative of 
paying higher franchise taxes or losing their rights o f carrying on their business.48 As a 
result, their franchise for the concession was raised by nearly 30 per cent, that is, from 
820,000 to 1.6 million dollars in 1905.49
Compared with that o f the Hongyuan Gongsi and the Fantan licensing enterprise, 
the experience o f the franchised syndicates that ran the Shan and Pu Lotteries was even 
more nasty. Their franchise changed hands four times during the last decade o f the Qing 
dynasty (see table below). This phenomenon shows that gambling farmers became milking 
objects whereas the provincial government was blinded by avarice.
TABLE 1:
Franchised syndicates undertaking the Shan and Pu Lotteries Operation, 1900(?)-
1911#
Terms for undertaking the Operations
Span of Time Names of Syn- Duration
(Years)
11th moon, 1900- Hongfa
Gongsi
425,000 100,000 8
11th moon, 1903 Wei Tingxun
11th moon, 1903- Yuyuan
Gongsi
1,000,000 200,000 8
11th moon, 1904 Zhou Yongfu
12th moon, 1904- Zhou Yongfu 1,300,000 1,000,000 tls 360,000
(?), 1906 Yi Qikang
(?), 1906- Yi Qikang About
3rd moon, 1907 2,000,000
3rd-10th moon, 1907 Yonghe Gonsi 
(Lu
Bangyuan)
1,500,000 600,000 tls 480,000 6
10th moon, 1907- Shaorong 1,600,000 600,000 tls 480,000 6
8th moon, 1909 Su Bingshu 
etc
8th moon, 1909- Su Bingshu 
etc
2,000,000 600,000 tls 384,000 tls* 6
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Source: Huazi daily, 4/1/1904; 5/1/1904; 19/1/1904; 25/4/1907; 10/11/1907; Hong Kong 
Telegraph, 9/10/1909.
Notes: # Unless otherwise stated, unit in the table is denoted in dollars.
* Payment on annual basis.
According to the above table, it is discernible that on average each syndicate had 
a life-span o f 2.5 years; o f these, the Yonghe Gongsi was the shortest, about seven months. 
Having said that, the Shaorong Gongsi was in fact, a derivative o f the Yuyuan, which was 
reorganised after it lost its monopolistic right to Yonghe and renamed it Shaorong. The 
salient feature is that the quota of the franchise tax was o f an upward trend throughout the 
period, whereas the duration for undertaking the business was shortened from eight to six 
years. It should be noted that the prohibition o f the white pigeon lottery in 1904 and the 
abolition o f the civil service examination next year cost the provincial government a large 
revenue. It was against this background that the above-mentioned syndicates fell prey to 
circumstances. In fact, the provincial government did not conceal its real motives behind 
the successive replacement o f gambling syndicates, financial considerations. It stated 
clearly that, “the Supreme Board of Reorganization takes fiscal considerations into account 
and accordingly it will entrust the undertaking o f the Shan and Pu Lotteries only to those 
syndicates that can forward higher franchise tax to the government”.50 Also, it heaped all 
the blame on those syndicates that failed to meet its new demands; it was because o f their 
stinginess and absence o f zealous for the public interests that they lost their franchise.51
According to the same table, it is notable that for Yuyuan Gongsi, its annual tax 
payment increase doubled and its contribution to the lump sum multiplied nearly seven 
fold with its enjoyment o f the franchise. To a lesser degree, its derivative, the Shaorong 
Gongsi faced a similar experience. Moreover, it was not uncommon for the provincial 
government to make demands that were not shown in the table upon the Gongsi. For 
instance, in 1905 after much haggling, the Yuyuan Gongsi was forced to advance a sum of 
300,000 dollars to the provincial government which suffered a depletion o f funds.52 Next 
year, the Yuyuan Gongsi was ordered not only to increase its franchise tax payment by half 
a million taels (about 700,000 dollars), but was also forced to agree to advance a loan of 
one million taels to the provincial government. In spite o f this, the provincial government 
still renounced its agreement with the Yuyuan Gongsi, and entrusted the Shan and Pu 
Lotteries to another bidder, the Yonghe Gongsi. The government justified such an act on 
the grounds that the Yuyuan Gongsi was in acute financial difficulties as it had fallen into 
arrears o f tax payment for two months amounting to over 57,000 taels, and had failed to 
send even a dollar to the projected mandarin enterprises as promised. It was inappropriate 
for the Gongsi to carry on business in these circumstances.53 A drastic change took place 
seven months later. The Yuyuan Gongsi was reorganised and renamed to Shaorong 
Gongsi; it offered better terms than those o f the Yonghe Gongsi to the provincial 
government. As the Yonghe Gongsi expressed no interest in retaining its control over the 
franchise, the Shaorong Gongsi was rewarded with the right for undertaking the Shan and 
Pu Lottery operation.54
From the above table, it is discernible that among the syndicate that ran the Shan 
and Pu lotteries business, the Yuyuan Gongsi and Shaorong Gongsi had the longest life 
span; each of them lasted a duration of 3 years and 4 months. It should be borne in mind 
that the Shaorong Gongsi was, in fact, a derivative o f the Yuyuan Gongsi. Actually, they 
should be treated as one single entity, the Yuyuan-Shaorong Gongsi. In these circumstance, 
its longevity is even more striking. The crux o f the matter is that o f its shareholders, some
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had good and influential political connection as well as ample means. For instance, Zhou 
Yongfu, a big shareholder o f the Yuyuan Gongsi, was the nephew o f Zhou Tung-shang, 
who had also invested 100,000 dollars in the enterprise. It was reported that Tung-shang 
had decided to be designated as minister to Great Britain but for his father and elder 
brother’s involvement in the embezzlement o f funds o f the maritime customs of 
Guangzhou amounting to nearly two million dollars.55 The leading figure o f the Shaorong 
Gongsi, Su Bingshu, was even more illustrious in wealth and power than Zhou Yongfu. 
He acquired the official title director o f 3rd rank by purchase and became a member o f the 
Provincial Assembly o f Guangdong. He owned extensive business interests in Guangzhou 
and Foshan. In the 9th moon of 1910 Su and a number o f provincial assembly member 
actively lobbied for the business interests o f the Shaorong Gongsi through the Assembly 
and met with success. This, in turn, raised a political storm within the province. When he 
was in financial trouble, it was reported that on account of his extensive business interests, 
if  he declared bankruptcy it would have an adverse effect on the commercial activities of 
Guangzhou.56 It was against this background that when the Yuyuan Gongsi's franchise was 
forfeited, it could make an appeal to the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Industries 
and indicted the provincial authorities for false accusation. The Ministry, in turn, ordered 
the Governor-General o f the province, Zhou Fu, to reinvestigate the matter.57
Although the Yuyuan-Shaorong Gongsi succeeded in retrieving the franchise, the 
Gongsi soon reached the limit o f its resources. In fact, according to the above table, the 
Shaorong Gongsi merely outbid its rival, the Yonghe Gongsi, by 100,000 dollars for 
franchise tax payment, whereas for contribution and capital subscribed to the projected 
mandarin enterprise, there was no increase at all. In the 4th moon of 1909 a new syndicate 
offered to undertake the business at the terms of 2.4 million dollars for annual franchise 
tax payment and another 900,000 taels for contribution. Ostensibly, these terms were far 
more generous than that offered by the Shaorong Gongsi at present. Nevertheless, the 
provincial government had second thoughts despite the fact that the annual franchise tax 
and the contribution offered by the new syndicate were considerably higher than those 
offered by the Shaorong Gongsi. The terms were, in fact, unattractive in the sense that the 
contribution was not to be paid in one lump sum, but by instalments spread over six years, 
and only a month’s franchise tax was to be paid as deposit in security. It pressed the two 
competing rivals to come to terms. For the new syndicate, it was required to pay the 
contribution in the lump and all its subscribed capital to the projected mandarin enterprise, 
while for the Shaorong Gongsi, it was required to increase the annual franchise tax by 
400,000 dollars and to clear off all arrears of payment. As to these counter-offers, they met 
with a lukewarm response from both the new syndicate and the Shaorong Gongsi.5* 
Although ultimately the Shaorong Gongsi complied with the terms offered, it indicates that 
the Gongsi had reached its limit at this stage, and for the provincial government the 
possibility o f further revenue- generating from this sources was hedged with practical 
difficulties.
With the establishment o f the constitutional movement at the end o f the Qing the 
Guangdong Provincial Assembly launched a frontal assault on all forms of gambling in the 
province. The comprehensive ban on gambling was at last instituted in March 1911, and 
on the whole, the prohibition was strictly enforced.59 This event sealed the fate of the 
business o f the Shan and Pu lotteries.
Gambling syndicates coveted the franchise of operation in anticipation of fat 
returns from the undertaking. Actually, the business o f the Shan and Pu Lotteries was 
lucrative. It was reported that for the Yuyuan Gongsi, in 1905, monthly profits from the 
Shan and Pu Lotteries were as high as 90,000 and 100,000 dollars respectively,60 while for
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its derivative, the Shaorong Gongsi, within the last five months o f 1910, profits from the 
undertaking amounted to more than 600,000 dollars.61 However, these profits could not 
make good the deficits resulting from the high expenditure on payment o f the franchise tax, 
the contribution and other items. Although it had reaped good profits from the business, 
for three months the Yuyuan Gongsi was unable to pay its winners in 1905.62
A similar situation also appeared in the case o f the Shaorong Gongsi. The profit 
o f 600,000 dollars it realized was hardly sufficient to cover half o f the arrears o f tax 
payment, which amounted to about 1,040,000 taels (1,440,000 dollars). In addition to this, 
the Gongsi was also in arrears o f its payment o f capital committed to projected mandarin 
enterprises amounting to 263,000 taels.63 As the Shaorong Gongsi was unable to pay these 
arrears, the provincial government took it over and deprived Su Bingshu, its head, o f his 
3rd rank official title. It also detained him into custody and ordered him to clear all its 
arrears within a month at the risk o f his property being confiscated.64 Finally, Su settled 
the issue by selling a great part o f his property for compensation.65
It was well known that Guangdong was one of the provinces where merchants were 
most active in undertaking the tax responsibility in view of the growing pressure from the 
central government to raise revenue, especially that o f likin, at the turn o f the century. It 
would be useful to make a comparison between the gambling undertakings and other 
revenue farms within the province. In 1899, Gangyi, the imperial commissioner, was 
entrusted with the task o f financial reorganization in Guangdong. On his arrival he found 
that annual collection o f the provincial reported likin revenue had never reached 2 million 
taels. He asserted that this happened because o f the embezzlement and misappropriation 
o f the clerks and underlings. It was against this background that Gangyi farmed out the 
collection o f likin revenue throughout the province to the merchant guilds o f silk, tea, 
timber, money exchange and others for an annual franchise tax o f 4 million taels from 1900 
on under the supervision o f the provincial authorities. For Gangyi, such an arrangement 
not only avoided the above-mentioned abuse but also economised the administrative 
expenses. Whereas for the heads o f the merchant guilds, the arrangement was not inimical 
to their interests; the increased portion o f the new tax was merely what it had been in the 
past, excessively exacted by the tax collectors. However, the scheme turned out to be futile. 
According to the agreement, likin farmers were forced to forward a portion of the franchise 
tax amounting to 1,622,222 taels from late June to early November 1900. Nevertheless, 
only 1,165,240 taels had been delivered; o f these 700,000 taels were security in deposit. 
It was reported that local officials overseeing the levy of likin revenue, raised the level of 
collection arbitrarily at some likin stations; consequently, traders launched a boycott 
against these stations and proceeds o f likin declined sharply.
In these circumstances, the Guangdong provincial authorities had to abrogate the 
agreement and to revert the administration o f likin collection to its original state. Payment 
o f the franchise tax in arrears spanned from late June to early November 1900 and was to 
be shared between the merchant guilds as well as the local officials concerned.66 Gangyi’s 
attempt to reorganise the likin collection proved to be counter-productive as he forced up 
the target to an exorbitant and unrealistic level. As a result merchant guilds failed to meet 
their obligation and the government took over the administration o f likin. Nevertheless, 
the heads o f the merchant guilds fared far better than the gambling farmers, for they were 
in a better bargaining position under the tax responsibility system during the late Qing 
period. Under such a system, merchant guilds were deemed the organisation most 
qualified for undertaking the task. According to Susan Mann, “This meant tax farmers had 
to come from the businesses that were being taxed; they had to be businessmen themselves, 
preferably respected leaders —  ‘men o f means’”.67
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The above-mentioned experience was by no means unique to the gambling farmers 
in late Qing Guangdong. Actually, the Liang-Huai salt merchant o f Yangzhou, and the 
Cohong merchant o f Guangdong suffered the same fate earlier. As to the total contribution 
o f Liang-Huai salt merchants to the imperial court and the government, it was estimated 
at 65,091,491 taels during the reigns o f Qianlong and Jiaqing (1736-1820).68 In 18th century 
China, the people were envious o f the Liang-Huai salt merchants for their immense 
wealth.69 Yet, on account o f incessant forced contribution and official exaction, as well as 
degeneration on their own part, many o f them went into liquidation around 1830.70 The 
Cohong merchants were no match for the Liang-Huai salt merchants in terms o f 
contribution to the court and the government; the grand total o f their contribution was 
estimated at 5,085,000 taels during the period 1773-1835.71 In addition to this, they were 
always subject to the ruthless extortion o f the Hoppo and other officials, who ordered them 
to be responsible for the tribute to the imperial court and seized the opportunity to make 
exacting demands on them. On account o f this, some o f them were ruined financially, 
some were put in jail, while some were exiled to Ili.72 On other occasions, the Cohong 
head merchant would practice bribery so that he could be relieved from the burdensome 
responsibility.73 Even so, they would be reappointed whenever necessary.74 No wonder a 
Hong merchant said, “ [I] shall rather be a dog than a Hong head merchant” .75 This vividly 
reflects their predicament.
In the eyes o f the Qing government, the status o f gambling farmers o f late Qing 
Guangdong were never put on the same par with that o f the Liang-Huai salt merchants and 
the Cohong merchants. They were treated as rootless loafers who were not engaged in 
proper work. Even for those officials who advocated lifting the ban on gambling they 
merely viewed the measure as a temporary expedient rather than a regular course in 
consideration o f their administrative responsibilities and the pressure o f public opinion. 
What they coveted was revenue derived from legalization o f gambling operations. The 
Guangdong authorities would tear up their agreement with a syndicate i f  it could not pay 
the franchise tax in full or increase its contribution to the government when necessity arose. 
It would then entrust the undertaking to a new syndicate that could make a tempting offer. 
The fact authorities that accommodated themselves to the requests o f the gambling farmers 
on such an issue as the postponement o f special examinations, should not be mistaken for 
the might o f the farmers. Without inhibitions the provincial government pressed repeated 
demands upon the gambling farmers, who in turn, either tendered their submission or 
risked the forfeiture o f the franchise. Only in one sense were the gambling farmers more 
fortunate than the salt merchants and the Cohong merchants. They were merely of 
provincial importance and could step down the stage o f history, whereas the names o f the 
salt merchants and Cohong merchants were listed on the rolls o f the Board o f Revenue, it 
was extremely difficult for them to be disenrolled.76
In the last decade o f the Qing dynasty, mercantilism formed the centre o f attraction. 
For the promotion o f industrial and commercial development, the Qing government broke 
all precedents by bestowing generous rewards on the undertakers. It dispatched prominent 
officials abroad for canvassing overseas Chinese investment in China. And what is more, 
it reversed its former attitude o f showing an open hostility to the formation o f association 
and gave active support and encouragement to the establishment o f the chamber of 
commerce. However, because o f their embarrassing status and dubious character the 
gambling farmers could not reap the full benefits from the surge o f mercantilism. By 
contrast, the provincial government kept a covetous eye on them and they were treated 
merely as milking targets. Tax farming o f gambling was injurious to their long term 
interests. Their association with the Guangdong authorities affords a clue to the essence
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of the official-merchant relations during the late Qing period.
Key differences immediately appear between the way o f the operation in the case 
o f late Qing Guangdong gambling farmers and tax farmers o f Southeast Asia in the 
colonial period. In Southeast Asia in the early years as the state was weak in relation to 
Chinese revenue farmers, “who were not called into being but rather coopted by the state”. 
When the farmers failed to meet their obligations in full, often government had few 
options but to accept reduced or deferral payment. In Howard Dick’s words, “Revenue 
farming was therefore in the nature of an alliance between the state and the business elite. 
Both had something to offer and something to gain”.77 With the extension of state power, 
revenue farming became an increasingly risky business. Even so, European colonial 
officials, no matter what forms o f oppression they might have been responsible for, tended 
to stick to the letter o f the law in their dealings with revenue farmers and gave them a 
degree o f protection. Whereas the experience o f the late Qing Guangdong gambling 
farmers indicates the fact that officials were always able to made demands on them 
whenever possible.
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